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COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND COSMIC CONFLICT:






Many Christians experience severe cognitive dissonance when they 
try to reconcile belief that God is wholly good (omnibenevolent) 
and all-powerful (omnipotent) with the suffering and evil in this 
world. Would not anyone who is loving and kind and who is power-
ful enough to do so, act to prevent the horrible suffering in this 
world?1
This article attempts to address such cognitive dissonance by 
offering a rules-of-engagement framework for thinking about the 
problem of evil and the related issues of providence and prayer. 
Regarding providence, many ask why God does not act to prevent 
evils more often, or does so some times but not others? Regarding 
prayer, many wonder whether it makes sense to pray and petition an 
entirely good and loving God to intervene in some specific way. If 
God is entirely good and all-powerful, would he not act in the best 
way regardless of whether we ask him to do so? These issues relative 
to providence and prayer may cause further cognitive dissonance 
when juxtaposed with the many biblical accounts of God miracu-
lously intervening, sometimes in response to petitionary prayer. If 
God can do so in some cases, why do there appear to be so many 
cases where God does not do so?
I want to be very careful to make it clear that my aim in this 
brief article is not to justify evil or suffering or to downplay or trivi-
alize the real sufferings that people have experienced and continue 
to experience. For this reason, I will avoid using real-life examples of 
people’s suffering as anecdotes. In my view, the problem of suffer-
ing and evil can only be ultimately resolved by God himself, and I 
1 A version of this paper was originally presented at the Transforming Worldview(s) 
Conference at Andrews University on October 19, 2018. As such, it provides a very 
brief overview and merely an outline of a suggested approach relative to some of the 
biggest problems that cause cognitive dissonance for the Christian worldview.
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believe God will finally put an end to evil and suffering. The modest 
aim of this article is to explore a conceptual framework within 
which one might make sense of how there could be an all-powerful 
and entirely good and loving God, despite the kind and amount of 
horrendous evil in this world—without in any way justifying such 
evil—and to ask how this framework might help us address a couple 
of common conceptual problems that cause cognitive dissonance 
relative to divine providence and petitionary prayer.
Keywords: Problem of Evil, Theodicy, Cosmic Conflict, Petitionary 
Prayer, Providence
The Problems of Evil, Providence, and Prayer
The Problem of Petitionary Prayer
As Mark Karris defines it, “The chief aim of petitionary prayer is to ‘influence 
God to act in ways he would not have acted if he had not been requested to 
do so.’”2 For the purposes of this article, I will refer to this as the influence 
aim. While recognizing that petitionary prayer may have positive secondary 
effects like building community or changing the focus of the one who prays, 
Karris believes that this influence “aim of petitionary prayer,” does not make 
sense and involves a “distorted view of God.”3 Specifically, voicing a concern 
shared by many, Karris believes that “petitionary prayers for others” might 
“unknowingly suggest a diminished view of God’s loving nature” since, “if 
God loves” everyone he would already want what is best for them. If so, how 
could the petition make any difference to whether or not God would do such 
good things for our loved ones?4 In this regard, Scott A. Davison adds, “If I 
pray for something good to happen, then God already has a reason to bring it 
about, whether or not I pray for it, since it is a good thing.”5
Karris argues further that petitionary prayer, aimed at influencing God 
to bring about good things that he would not otherwise bring about, implies 
an “ignorant, ill-willed and manipulative God.”6 Karris believes such petition-
ary prayer implies: (1) an ignorant God, because an omniscient God would 
2 Mark Gregory Karris, Divine Echoes: Reconciling Prayer with the Uncontrolling 
Love of God (Orange, CA: Quoir, 2018), 68.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 53.
5 Scott A. Davison, “Petitionary Prayer,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 290. Cf. Davison’s fuller discussion of the issues related to petitionary 
prayer in Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017).
6 Karris, Divine Echoes, 52.
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know the best thing to do, (2) an ill-willed God, because an omnibenevolent 
God would want to do the best, and (3) a manipulative God because, Karris 
believes, an omnibenevolent God would not refrain from bringing about 
good unless we petition him to do so. Put simply, an all-knowing, entirely 
good, and sufficiently powerful God would know the best available good, 
want to bring about such good, and be capable of doing so. How, then, could 
it make sense to believe that petitionary prayer might influence God to do 
some good he otherwise would not do?
The Problem of Selective Miracles
The problem of petitionary prayer, as understood above, is closely related to 
the problem of selective miracles—the problem that arises relative to believing 
that God acts to prevent or mitigate horrendous evil in some situations but 
does not do so in other, apparently similar, situations. In Thomas Jay Oord’s 
view, this problem arises “[i]f God sometimes voluntarily acts miraculously 
but not at other times.”7 If God possesses the power to miraculously intervene 
to prevent some evils, Oord believes, God should use that power to thwart 
all instances of evil that would otherwise occur. Indeed, Oord argues, if God 
does not “prevent genuinely evil occurrences while having the power to do 
so, God is not love.”8 In this regard, Oord sharply criticizes the view of John 
Sanders and many others who believe that God possesses the power to prevent 
every instance of evil but allows some evils because he chooses to respect free 
will.9 If God is entirely good and loving, Oord and others claim, then God 
should prevent every instance of evil that he can.10
The Problem of Evil
This problem is directly related to the broader problem of evil, the logical 
form of which claims there is inconsistency between the premises: (1) God is 
all-powerful (omnipotent), (2) God is entirely good (omnibenevolent), and 
(3) there is evil in the world.11 Even if there is a way to defeat this logical 
problem of evil, some philosophers argue that the kind and amount of evil 
7 Thomas Jay Oord, The Uncontrolling Love of God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP 
Academic, 2015), 192.
8 Thomas Jay Oord, “Matching Theology and Piety: An Evangelical Process 
Theology of Love” (PhD diss., Claremont Graduate University, 1999), 345.
9 See John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, rev. ed. 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009).
10 Cf. the very similar argument put forth by David Ray Griffin in “Creation out 
of Nothing, Creation out of Chaos, and the Problem of Evil,” in Encountering Evil: 
Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2001), 117–118.
11 See J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64/254 (1955): 201–202.
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in this world renders it improbable that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent 
God exists (the so-called evidential problem of evil).12
In his book, God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most 
Important Question—Why We Suffer, Bart Ehrman frames this problem along 
the lines of the problem of selective miracles, asking: “If God intervened” in 
the biblical narratives, “why doesn’t he intervene now”?13 Noting that, “[f ]or 
the authors of the Bible,” God “is a God of love and power who intervenes” 
to prevent evil with “answered prayer and worked miracles,” Ehrman asks, 
“Where is this God now?”14 Given that, for “many people who inhabit this 
planet, life is a cesspool of misery and suffering,” Ehrman concludes that, if 
there is a God, “he certainly isn’t the one proclaimed by the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, the one who is actively and powerfully involved in the world.”15 As 
such, for Ehrman, the evil in this world undermines any claim “that there is a 
good and kindly disposed Ruler who is in charge.”16
Some Potential Solutions
Avoiding the Problems by Denying or Modifying the Premises
Such problems might be avoided by simply denying that God is all-powerful 
or by denying that God is entirely good.  If God is not good, there is no use 
trying to reconcile his utter goodness with the evil in the world, questions 
relative to so-called selective miracles, or issues related to petitionary prayer. 
If, on the other hand, God is not all-powerful, he cannot consistently be 
considered culpable for that which he lacks the power to do or prevent. 
For those who believe that God is entirely good and all-powerful (as I do), 
however, these are not viable options.17
One common way to elude the problem of petitionary prayer in particu-
lar is to deny that petitionary prayer can influence God to bring about some 
good he otherwise would not bring about. That is, one might deny what I 
12 For an introduction to the evidential problem of evil, see William L. Rowe, ed., 
God and the Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 121–233.
13 Bart D. Ehrman, God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Impor-




17 There are many other oft-proposed solutions worthy of consideration. Given 
space limitations, however, in this article I will only mention a few that might be 
useful to orient the reader regarding some available avenues. For a further discus-
sion of some prominent viable options in the contemporary discussion, see John C. 
Peckham, Theodicy of Love: Cosmic Conflict and the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2018), chapters 1 and 6.
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call the “influence aim” of petitionary prayer. For some, this involves denying 
the usefulness of petitionary prayer altogether. Others adopt the common 
view that prayer—including petitionary prayer—is aimed not at influencing 
God, but at affecting us.18 However, while I see no problem with recognizing 
various benefits of petitionary prayer, including positively affecting the one 
who offers such prayer, denying that petitionary prayer may influence God 
seems to run counter to numerous cases in Scripture where prayer is exhorted 
and portrayed as having some influence on whether or not God brings about 
some good.19
Denying that God works miracles at all might reduce this problem and 
resolve the problem of selective miracles. Such a denial, however, also runs 
counter to the many “miracle” accounts in Scripture. Instead of denying 
miracles altogether, Oord attempts to resolve the problem by claiming that 
God’s very nature is uncontrolling love, which renders God incapable (by 
nature) of intervening in ways that would prevent the evils in our world.20 
However, it is unclear how such a view can itself be reconciled with the kinds 
of miracle accounts that appear in Scripture, such as providing manna from 
heaven (Exod 16:35) and raising people from the dead (e.g., 1 Kings 17:17–
24). If God actually intervened in these (and other) ways attributed to him in 
Scripture, it is difficult to see how one can coherently claim that God is (by 
nature) incapable of intervening in a way that would—for instance—prevent 
hunger or reverse death. As such, the claim that God is (by nature) incapable 
of working the kinds of miracles that would prevent or reverse at least some 
of the evils we see all around us (e.g., hunger and death) would seem to not 
be a viable option for the person who believes God actually performed the 
miracles attributed to him in Scripture.
Skeptical Theism and the Free Will Defense
Apart from resolving the problems by denying or modifying one or more 
of the premises, many other prominent avenues are available for Christian 
theists, two of which I will briefly introduce here. First, one might simply 
hold the position that God has good reasons for acting as he does, but given 
our limited knowledge, we should not expect to be in a position to know just 
18 See, e.g., Christopher Woznicki, “Is Prayer Redundant? Calvin and the Early 
Reformers on the Problem of Petitionary Prayer,” JETS 60.2 (2017): 333–48.
19 One example, among many others, is found in 2 Chronicles 7:14, wherein 
God states, “If my people who are called by my name humble themselves, pray, seek 
my face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and will 
forgive their sin and heal their land” (NRSV). Hereafter, all biblical quotations are 
taken from the NRSV unless otherwise noted.
20 Oord, Uncontrolling Love, 181. So, also, David Ray Griffin, “Rejoinder,” in 
Stephen T. Davis, Encountering Evil, 139.
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what those good reasons are. Something like this avenue, which has come 
to be labeled skeptical theism, appears to be supported in Scripture.21 For 
example, in the book of Job, God puts forward a series of questions to Job 
that highlight just how limited human knowledge is regarding the ways of 
God. One such question is, “Have the gates of death been revealed to you, 
or have you seen the gates of deep darkness? Have you comprehended the 
expanse of the earth? Declare, if you know all this” (Job 38:17–18; cf. 38:4, 
33; Isa 55:8–9; Rom 11:33). To this and other questions, Job appropriately 
responds, “I have uttered what I did not understand, things too wonderful 
for me, which I did not know” (Job 42:3). In this regard, as Alvin Plantinga 
comments regarding the discourse in Job, just because one “can’t see what 
God’s reason might be” relative to suffering and evil, it “doesn’t follow that 
probably God doesn’t have a reason.”22 Whatever else one might say regarding 
the problem of evil and related issues, it would be wise to recognize just how 
little we know regarding the ways of God.
Another highly regarded way to approach the problem of evil is the free 
will defense.23 Put simply, the free will defense maintains that evil is the result 
of the misuse of creaturely free will. God granted some creatures a kind of 
free will that is incompatible with determinism (typically known as libertar-
ian free will) and, given God granting such freedom, it is not possible for 
God to determine that all beings freely do what God desires.24 In his widely 
lauded articulation of this defense, Alvin Plantinga argues that a world with 
“significantly free” creatures might be “more valuable, all else being equal, 
than a world containing no free creatures.”25 Yet, “To create creatures capable 
of moral good,” God “must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He 
21 For more on skeptical theism, see Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-
Snyder, eds., The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Malden, MA: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2013), 377–506. See, further, Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer, 
eds., Skeptical Theism: New Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
22 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 497.
23 The free will defense, particularly as articulated by Alvin Plantinga, is widely 
viewed as the most successful defense against the logical problem of evil to date. See 
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974); Alvin Plantinga, 
God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). In this regard, the atheist 
William Rowe commented, “the logical problem of evil has been severely diminished, 
if not entirely resolved” as a “result of Plantinga’s work.”  William Rowe, “Introduction 
to Part II: The Logical Problem of Evil,” in God and the Problem of Evil, ed. William 
L. Rowe (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 76.
24 That is, as Katherin Rogers puts it, “God can no more make a controlled free 
being than He can make a round square.” Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 101. 
25 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30.
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can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time 
prevent them from doing so.”26 Some free creatures “went wrong in the 
exercise of their freedom” and “this is the source of moral evil” but it “counts 
neither against God’s omnipotence nor against his goodness; for He could 
have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only by removing the possibility 
of moral good.”27
In my view, the free will defense goes a long way in helping us deal 
with the problem of evil and may be supported by the many instances in 
Scripture wherein humans choose to do otherwise than God ideally desires.28 
However, one may rightly wonder about evil occurrences that it would appear 
God could prevent without contravening anyone’s libertarian free will. What 
about so-called natural evils, like tornadoes and hurricanes? What about other 
evils that God might prevent by divine revelation (e.g., a well-placed warning 
or report)? Regarding these and other questions, I believe a cosmic conflict 
perspective is most helpful, which builds upon the basic free will defense but 
goes beyond it to include the free and consequential agency of celestial beings 
such as angels and demons.29 While I do not mean to suggest that a cosmic 
conflict perspective answers all significant questions relative to the problems 
of evil, selective miracles, and petitionary prayer, I believe such a perspective 
does provide a framework that helps address these problems.30
Cosmic Conflict and the Rules of Engagement
Cosmic Conflict Overview
A cosmic conflict perspective supposes that there is an ongoing clash between 
God’s kingdom and the demonic realm. As C. S. Lewis put it, “This universe 
is at war;” it is not “a war between independent powers” but a “rebellion” 
and “we are living in a part of the universe occupied by the rebel.”31 The 
very postulation of such a conflict, however, already raises questions that 
may cause cognitive dissonance, particularly if one conceives of this cosmic 
conflict as primarily a conflict of sheer power or force. If God is all-powerful, 
then no creature could oppose God at the level of sheer power. If this is 
26 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30.
27 Ibid., 30.
28 See the discussion in Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapter 2. Cf. John C. 
Peckham, “Does God Always Get What He Wants? A Theocentric Approach to 
Divine Providence and Human Freedom,” AUSS 52.2 (2014): 195–212.
29 Plantinga himself suggests something along these lines as a possibility. See 
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 192.
30 I make a biblical, theological, and philosophical case for this view in Peckham, 
Theodicy of Love.
31 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 45.
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so, a cosmic conflict is only possible to the extent that God grants celestial 
creatures the freedom to oppose his kingdom. On this view, evils in this world 
may result not only from the free decisions of humans, but also from the free 
decisions of rebellious celestial beings (e.g., demons). Such an approach is in 
keeping with the traditional view that Satan and his angels rebelled against 
God’s government, thus falling from the moral perfection with which God 
created them. As David Bentley Hart understands it, the world is under the 
“mutinous authority of angelic and demonic ‘powers.’”32 Kevin Vanhoozer 
adds, “The world is now under the dominion of the powers of darkness” and, 
as such, “the world resists and rejects God’s authoritative rule.”33 
Even a cursory reading of the gospels indicates some kind of cosmic 
conflict. As Brian Han Gregg puts it, “The conflict between God and Satan is 
clearly a central feature of Jesus’ teaching and ministry” (see, e.g., Matt 4:1–11; 
cf. Matt 13:27–30, 37–43).34 This conflict, which also appears throughout 
the OT, is a central feature of NT teaching (see, e.g., Rev 12:3–10).35 For 
example, Ephesians 6:11–12 exhorts, “Put on the whole armor of God, so 
that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For our struggle 
is not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers, against the 
authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the 
spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places” (cf. Acts 26:18; Rom 8:38; 2 
Cor 10:3–5; Eph 1:19–21; Col 2:15 1 Pet 3:22).
As I understand the nature of this cosmic conflict, the devil has slandered 
God’s character in the heavenly court, alleging that God is not fully just and 
challenging God’s moral government. Insofar as God respects the free agency 
of moral creatures, including their freedom of belief (epistemic freedom), such 
charges against God’s character and government in the heavenly court cannot 
be settled by sheer power. No display or exercise of power could defeat an 
allegation against one’s character. Instead, God offers a demonstration of his 
character of utter righteousness and love, supremely manifested at the cross (cf. 
Rom 3:25–26; 5:8). On this view, much of the cosmic conflict is a cosmic court-
room drama, in which God himself—via the cross and otherwise—provides a 
conclusive demonstration that defeats the enemy’s allegations, precipitating the 
final eradication of the enemy’s usurping kingdom (cf. Rev 20–22).36
32 David Bentley Hart, The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 65.
33 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Faith Speaking Understanding (Louisville: WJK, 2014), 
100.
34 Brian Han Gregg, What Does the Bible Say about Suffering? (Downers Grove, 
IL: IVP Academic, 2016), 66. Cf. Peckham, Theodicy of Love.
35 For a brief survey of the cosmic conflict motif in Scripture see Peckham, 
Theodicy of Love.
36 See Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapters 3–5.
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In summary, the basic cosmic conflict motif maintains:
1. There is a cosmic conflict between the kingdom of God and the 
devil and his minions (see., e.g., Acts 26:18; Matt 12:24–29; Rev 
12:7–10; cf. Matt 25:41), who are celestial creatures that have 
rebelled against God’s government (cf. 2 Pet 2:4; Col 1:16–17).
2. This conflict is not a conflict of sheer power, which would be impos-
sible given God’s omnipotence; it is a conflict over character that 
includes allegations against God’s judgment and government (see, 
e.g., Job 1–2; Zech 3:1–3; Matt 13:27–29; John 8:44; Rom 3:3–8, 
25–26; Jude 9; Rev 12:9–11; 13:4–6; Cf. Gen 3:1–6).
3. Nevertheless, the devil, whom Jesus himself calls the “ruler of this 
world” (John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; cf. 2 Cor 4:4), possesses some real 
authority—some genuine but limited and temporary rulership—in 
this world, but this temporary rulership is quickly approaching its 
end (see, e.g., Rev 12:12).
The Rules-of-Engagement Framework
This understanding brings us to a discussion of what I call the rules-of-
engagement framework of the cosmic conflict.37 In my view, not only does the 
biblical data indicate that there is a cosmic conflict between God’s kingdom 
and the domain of darkness, the biblical data also indicates that this conflict 
takes place within some consistent parameters, or rules of engagement, within 
which those who oppose God are allowed to operate.38 
37 I adopted this phrase “rules of engagement” for lack of better terminology to 
describe the parameters within which the cosmic conflict takes place, though I do not 
mean to signal that such “rules of engagement” are similar to those common in the 
context of human warfare. Since adopting this terminology a number of years ago, I 
have been made aware that others have also used this terminology. One recent example 
is found in Joshua Rasmussen, “The Great Story Theodicy,” in Joshua Rasmussen and 
Felipe Leon, Is God the Best Explanation of Things? A Dialogue (Cham, Switzerland: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 239. Rasmussen uses the phrase differently than I do 
to describe the way God operates in an orderly fashion, specifically “along lines of 
pre-established order—rules of engagement with other sentient beings. The purpose 
of the rules is to maintain orderly arenas. Natural causes are the normal causes of a 
rational Mind acting throughout the universe.” Rasmussen, “The Great Story Theod-
icy,” 239. As part of his great story theodicy, he hypothesizes that within the story 
there are “consistent rules that cannot be broken at the characters’ whims,” which 
resonates (broadly speaking) with the way I use the phrase here, though I use it to 
describe far more than this, particularly in relation to the cosmic conflict. Rasmussen, 
“The Great Story Theodicy,” 227.
38 I can only provide a brief survey of some support for this below. For a more 
adequate account, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapter 4. 
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Rules of Engagement in Job
While some argue that the Satan in Job 1–2 is not to be identified with 
the Satan of the NT and may merely be a benign court prosecutor, in my 
view, the actions and speech of this celestial being in Job 1–2 indicate that he 
is antagonistic not only to Job but also to God himself.39 Indeed, (the) Satan 
charges that Job fears God only because God protects and blesses him, having 
put “a fence around him” but that, if calamity is permitted to befall Job, he 
will curse God (Job 1:9–11). This allegation against the integrity of Job’s 
loyalty and character also amounts to an allegation against God’s character 
because it contradicts God’s earlier judgment that Job was “a blameless and 
upright man who fears God and turns away from evil” (Job 1:8; cf. 2:3). 
Lindsay Wilson comments, this “is a questioning not just of Job’s motives but 
also of God’s rule. The accuser is saying to God that Job does not deserve all 
his blessings, and thus God is not ruling the world with justice.”40 In Frances 
Andersen’s words, “God’s character and Job’s are both slighted.”41 Victor P. 
Hamilton adds, this is “patently slanderous.”42 
John Hartley writes, further, that here (the) Satan “acts as a troublemaker, 
a disturber of the kingdom” who displays a “contemptuous attitude,” which 
“deviates from” the “explanation” that he is a benign “prosecuting attorney 
of the heavenly council.”43 Indeed, in accusing Job (and indirectly God) and 
slandering God’s judgment (among other ways), the Satan of Job matches the 
modus operandi of the Satan of the NT, who is called the “accuser of our breth-
ren” (Rev 12:10) and “a liar and the father of lies” (John 8:44). Moreover, 
the very allegation of the Satan of Job indicates that there were already some 
existing boundaries or limits that he could not cross (see Job 1:10). In this 
discourse and in the similar discourse in Job 2, the accuser argues that such 
limits—which I call rules of engagement—somehow unfairly impede his 
ability to prove his case against Job and God.
It is important to notice, at this juncture, that the dialogues between 
God and (the) Satan in Job 1–2 take place within the setting of a heavenly 
council scene. As Job 1:6 states, “One day the heavenly beings came to 
present themselves before the LORD, and [the] Satan also came among 
39 For example, though she recognizes that the satan “subtly becomes God’s 
adversary” in Job 1–2, Carol Newsom believes that, in Job, ‘the satan’ . . . designate[s] 
a particular divine being in the heavenly court, one whose specialized function was to 
seek out and accuse persons disloyal to God.” “Job,” in NIB 4:347, 438.
40 Lindsay Wilson, Job, THOTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 34.
41 Francis I. Andersen, Job, TOTC (Nottingham: Inter-Varsity, 1976), 89. Cf. 
Robert L. Alden, Job, NAC (Nashville: B&H, 1993), 55.
42 “Satan,” in ABD 5:985.
43 John E. Hartley, Job, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 71, 71n8.
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them” (cf. Job 2:1). In Job 1 and 2, the “heavenly beings” (literally “sons of 
God,” bĕnê hāʾĕlōhîm) are typically understood by biblical scholars to be 
“celestial beings” within the “council of the heavenly host.”44 
Accordingly, biblical scholars generally agree that the scenes in Job 
1–2 are heavenly council scenes, two of many such biblical instances of the 
heavenly council, which consists of celestial beings who possess some ruling 
authority with regard to what transpires on earth (see, e.g., 1 Kings 22:19–23; 
2 Chr 18:18–22; Job 1:6–12; 2:1–7; Pss 29:1–2; 82; 89:5–8; Isa 6:1–13; 
Zech 3:1–7; Dan 7:9–14; cf. Isa 24:21–23; Jer 23:18, 22; Ezek 1–3; Dan 
4:13, 17; Amos 3:7–8).45 As John E. Hartley puts it: “Several passages in the 
OT” appear “to assume that God governs the world through a council of 
the heavenly host,” but such passages do so in keeping with “monotheistic 
belief.”46 John E. Goldingay states, further, “This heavenly cabinet discusses 
and makes decisions about earthly events more broadly (see, e.g., 1 Kings 
22:19–22; Ps 82; Isa 6; Dan 7:9–14), and its members are then involved in 
the implementing of these decisions.”47
The dialogues between God and (the) Satan, then, are not private ones 
but are part of proceedings before the heavenly council—part of a celestial 
courtroom drama. The Satan of Job argues that the “fence around” Job 
prevents him from proving his case against God’s judgment of Job. It is in 
this heavenly courtroom context that God agrees to allow the limits on (the) 
Satan’s power to be extended, the alternative being that (the) Satan’s allega-
tions would remain an open question in the heavenly council and God might 
appear to be abusing his power to shut down an investigation of his character 
and government.
Thereafter, while under (the) Satan’s power (Job 1:12), numerous calami-
ties befall Job’s household, including the death of his children (Job 1:13–19). 
Yet, Job does not curse God (cf. Job 1:20–22), which directly falsifies (the) 
Satan’s claim that he would curse God. In the nearly identical heavenly council 
44 Hartley, Job, 71. See, also, David J. A. Clines, Job 1-20, WBC (Dallas: Word, 
2002), 17–18; Marvin H. Pope, Job, AB (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2008), 9; Alden, Job, 53.
45 For more on the heavenly council motif, sometimes referred to in OT scholar-
ship as the divine council or divine assembly, see E. T. Mullen, Jr., “Divine Assembly,” 
in ABD 2:214; E. T. Mullen, Jr., The Divine Council in Canaanite and Early Hebrew 
Literature, HSM 24 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1980); Michael S. Heiser, “Divine 
Council,” in The Lexham Bible Dictionary, ed. John D. Barry et al. (Bellingham, WA: 
Lexham, 2016), 10. Cf. Ari Mermelstein and Shalom E. Holtz, eds., The Divine 
Courtroom in Comparative Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
46 Hartley, Job, 71n6.
47 John E. Goldingay, Old Testament Theology, Volume 2: Israel’s Faith (Downers 
Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 45.
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scene in Job 2, (the) Satan again claims the limits are too stringent and again 
the limits are extended. In this second, parallel instance, (the) Satan directly 
afflicts Job (Job 2:4–7), but yet again Job does not curse God (Job 2:8–10).
The “fence” or limits to which (the) Satan objects in these heavenly court 
scenes (Job 1:10–11; 2:4–5) exemplify what I call the rules of engagement in 
the cosmic conflict. Because God always keeps his word and never breaks his 
promises (cf. Tit 1:2; Heb 6:18), insofar as God has promised to allow (the) 
Satan to work within particular parameters, God cannot (morally) intervene 
to prevent (the) Satan from doing what he wishes within those parameters. 
While posing no limit on God’s sheer power, any agreement God enters into 
would effectively limit (morally) God’s future action. These rules may thus 
be thought of as “covenantal” in the minimal and limited sense that they 
result from bilateral or multilateral agreement (in Job they are the product 
of courtroom proceedings before the heavenly council), such that they are 
not subject to being unilaterally determined or modified by the parties 
involved and—since they are the result of court proceedings—they may be 
far from ideal.
For a finite being to make any such case against the omnipotent God, 
that finite being must be granted some limited jurisdiction within which to 
operate, which God promises not to transgress. Such rules of engagement 
limit (morally) the exercise of God’s power to eliminate or mitigate evils that 
fall within the enemy’s temporary jurisdiction. If this is so, there may be many 
instances where God would otherwise choose to prevent and/or mitigate evil 
occurrences, but doing so would be against the rules of engagement, which 
God did not unilaterally decide and which he cannot (morally) unilaterally 
modify or contravene.
Yet, why would God enter into an agreement with such rules of engage-
ment in the first place? Without claiming to know just what God’s reasons 
might be, it could be that—given the serious allegations against God’s 
character, which if left unchecked would unravel the harmony and love of 
the universe and which could not be defeated in the minds of others by the 
exercise of sheer power—the most preferable way to defeat the enemy’s allega-
tions while maintaining the kind of free will necessary for love was to allow 
an open hearing and demonstration.48 Such an open forum, however, would 
require something like “rules of engagement,” which—as noted above—my 
be far from ideal because such rules are the product of courtroom proceedings 
before the heavenly council.
48 In this regard, John Hartley comments, “The main function of this assembly 
here is to provide an open forum in which Yahweh permits the testing of Job. That is, 
the plan to test Job was not hatched in a secret meeting between Yahweh and the satan. 
Rather it was decided openly before the heavenly assembly. In this setting Yahweh’s 
motivation, based on his complete confidence in Job, was fully known and thus it was 
above question.” Job, 72. Cf. Wilson, Job, 34.
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Rules of Engagement Elsewhere in Scripture
Many other instances of Scripture indicate that there are some consistent 
parameters—or rules of engagement—within which the cosmic conflict takes 
place, parameters that not only limit the action of the demonic opponents of 
God but that also limit (morally) God’s action. For example, in Daniel 10, 
an angel of God sent in response to Daniel’s prayer is delayed because ‘the 
prince of the kingdom of Persia opposed” him for three weeks, until Michael, 
the prince, “came to help” the angel from God (Daniel 10:2, 12–13; cf. 
10:20–11:1).49 Tremper Longman III sees this as “a clear case of spiritual 
conflict” and comments that, “though the divine realm heard and began 
responding immediately to Daniel’s prayers three weeks earlier, there was 
a delay because of a conflict, an obstacle in the form of the ‘prince of the 
Persian kingdom’ (v. 13).”50
Yet, how could this prince of Persia oppose God’s angel for three weeks, 
until celestial reinforcements came? If God is all-powerful, as Scripture 
affirms (cf. Jer 32:17; Matt 19:26; Rev 19:6), then God possessed the power 
to respond to Daniel immediately. Here, Daniel 10 portrays a genuine, 
ongoing, conflict between the kingdom of God and the “prince” of “Persia” 
(cf. Dan 10:20–11:1). In order for such a conflict to take place, God must not 
be exercising all his power; the enemy must be granted some consequential 
freedom, power, and jurisdiction that is not arbitrarily modified or removed 
but that is governed by some rules of engagement known to the involved 
parties (the details of which are not revealed to us). This jurisdiction includes 
authority to exercise power within specified limits, which entails correspond-
ing limitations relative to God’s intervention.
Scripture includes many other indications of rules of engagement in the 
cosmic conflict, some notable NT examples include:
(1) Christ’s repeated references to Satan as the “ruler of this world” (John 
12:31; 14:30; 16:11; cf. 2 Cor 4:4), which indicate some genuine rulership 
over the world, and the repeated corresponding references to the domain of 
darkness (Acts 26:18; Col 1:13; cf. Matt 12:24; 1 John 5:19); 
49 In the majority view of scholars, the “‘prince of the Persian kingdom’ is a 
supernatural being who fights on behalf of that human kingdom.”  Tremper Longman 
III, Daniel, NIVAC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), 250. While downplaying its 
contemporary significance, W. Sibley Towner notes, “the parallelism of the verse alone 
suggests that this prince is a peer of and counterpart to the angel Michael, who is the 
prince of Israel (cf. v. 21).” Daniel, Interpretation (Atlanta: John Knox, 1984), 153. 
Cf. Alexander Di Lella, Daniel, AB (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2008), 282; Goldingay, 
Daniel, 292; John J. Collins, Daniel. Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 374; 
Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, “Daniel,” in NIB 7:137; Stephen R. Miller, Daniel, 
NAC (Nashville: B&H, 1994), 285. Yet, even if this “prince” is taken to be the human 
ruler (as in Calvin’s view), an angel of God is nevertheless delayed three weeks.
50 Longman, Daniel, 249.
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(2) Satan’s claim, while tempting Christ, that all the “glory” and “author-
ity” of all the world’s kingdoms have “been given over to me, and I give it to 
anyone I please” (Luke 4:6; cf. John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11; Matt 12:24); 
(3) the evidently pre-arranged nature of Christ’s temptation, including 
the statement, “When the devil had finished every test, he departed from him 
until an opportune time” (Luke 4:13; cf. Gen 3) and Matthew’s report that 
“when the devil left him,” only then “suddenly angels came and waited on 
him” (Matt 4:11); 
(4) the demons’ response when they encounter Jesus, “What have you to 
do with us, Son of God? Have you come here to torment us before the time?” 
(Matt 8:29), implying a specified time of future judgment; 
(5) Satan’s “demand” to “sift” Peter “like wheat” (Luke 22:31), and Jesus 
correspondingly praying for Peter (Luke 22:32);
(6) the fact that Jesus “could do no deed of power there [in Nazareth], 
except that he laid his hands on a few sick people and cured them,” (Mark 
6:5) and Jesus’s statement that some “kind[s] of unclean spirits “can come out 
only through prayer” and faith (Mark 9:29; cf. Matt 17:20), and
(7) Paul’s explanation that “Satan blocked our way” from going to the 
Thessalonians as desired (1 Thess 2:18; cf. Rev 2:10).
Revelation provides further evidence regarding this rules-of-engagement 
framework. Therein, “the devil” is identified as the “great dragon” and “that 
ancient serpent,” who is “the deceiver of the whole world” (Rev 12:9) and is 
revealed to be the “ruler” behind the earthly kingdoms throughout the ages 
that oppose God’s rule and oppress God’s people. Indeed, “the dragon gave” 
the sea beast of Revelation 13 “his power and his throne and great authority” 
(Rev 13:2; cf. 13:5; 17:13–14) and “the whole earth followed the beast” and 
“worshiped the dragon, for he had given his authority to the beast, and they 
worshiped the beast” (Rev 13:3–4; cf. 13:6–8, 12). As such, the devil has been 
the celestial ruler behind oppressive earthly rulers and kingdoms throughout 
earth’s history.51 
Yet, Revelation also makes it clear that Satan’s dominion is limited and 
temporary. Revelation 12:12 exhorts the heavens to rejoice because, while “the 
devil has come down to” the earth and sea “with great wrath,” he has done 
so “because he knows that his time is short!” This reference to time, coupled 
with the reference to a specified time period of “forty-two months” during 
which the sea beast “was allowed to exercise authority” (Rev 13:5), undergirds 
the understanding that the temporary domain of the devil operates within 
some specified parameters (rules of engagement). Accordingly, one purpose 
of Christ’s work is to rescue the world from the domain of evil and reclaim it 
51 As G. K. Beale understands it, the “dragon in Revelation 12 was seen as the 
ultimate force behind the earthly kingdoms of the world.”  Revelation, NIGTC (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 683.
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unto the sole rulership of God. Thus, 1 John 3:8 proclaims, the “Son of God 
appeared for this purpose, to destroy the works of the devil” (cf. Heb 2:14; 
Rev 12:9–11).
Implications of the Rules-of-Engagement Framework
In the instances surveyed above (and elsewhere), I believe Scripture portrays a 
cosmic conflict between God and Satan within which Satan has raised allega-
tions against God’s character and Satan and his minions possess significant 
jurisdiction according to the rules of engagement that God has committed to 
within the cosmic conflict in order to settle such claims for the good of the 
entire cosmos.52 Against this background, we are now in a position to consider 
the relevance and implications of this rules-of-engagement framework for the 
problems of evil, selective miracles, and petitionary prayer. 
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of Evil
Relative to the problem of evil broadly, there may be rules of engagement in 
the cosmic conflict that (morally) prevent God from preventing evil occur-
rences that he would otherwise prevent. Insofar as God agrees to such rules of 
engagement, his future action would be (morally) limited. As such, some evils 
may fall within the temporary domain of the kingdom of darkness. It may 
be that God strongly desires to prevent every occurrence of evil, but doing so 
in some instances would be against the rules of engagement, which God has 
covenanted not to contravene. Of course, God may have many other reasons 
for not preventing some evil occurrences, many of which we are probably not 
in a position to know. Whereas divine action to prevent a given evil occur-
rence might be against the rules of engagement, it might also be the case that 
divine action to prevent a given evil occurrence would otherwise contradict 
God’s character and commitments to love and freedom and/or would result 
in even greater evil.
Given our limited human perspective, we cannot see or account for all 
of the various factors at work in any given situation. Perhaps some courses 
of action we think God should take are not available to him because of the 
rules of engagement, others might impinge on the extent of consequential 
free will that God has (irrevocably) granted to creatures, and it may be that 
still other courses would result in worse evils. As such, with respect to any 
instance wherein God does not intervene to prevent some horrendous evil, to 
do so might have: (1) been against the rules of engagement, (2) contravened 
creaturely free will in a way that would undercut love relationship, and/or (3) 
resulted in greater evil or less flourishing of love.
While, as briefly noted earlier, some might claim that God never should 
52 I do not have space to develop a more robust case for this motif in this brief 
article. For this, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapters 3–5.
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have agreed to such a rules-of-engagement framework in the first place, it 
may be that, given the kind and extent of free will necessary for the maximal 
flourishing of love, defeating the enemy’s slanderous allegations against God’s 
character and government requires a context in which a fair and open demon-
stration could take place (cf. Matt 13:29). We are not in a position to make 
confident judgments about this. Yet, while I cannot make anything like an 
adequate case for this in such a brief article, it seems to me that enough 
about the character of the suffering God of the cross is revealed to warrant the 
conclusion that this God can be trusted and that the all-knowing and perfectly 
wise God—who suffers most in the cosmic conflict in that he voluntarily 
shares our sufferings (cf. Isa 63:9)—would know just what is sufficient to 
defeat the devil’s allegations and inoculate the universe from evil forevermore 
(Rev 21:3; cf. Nah 1:9).53
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of “Selective” Miracles
This understanding sheds light on the problem of selective miracles. If one 
believes God actually did the kinds of miracles that are depicted in Scripture 
(e.g., transforming water into wine, healing blindness, calming storms, multi-
plying food to feed crowds, resurrecting the dead, et al.), then it follows that 
God is capable (at the level of sheer power) of miraculously preventing and/
or mitigating a vast array of evils of the kind that appear in our world today.
Given a rules-of-engagement framework, however, what may appear to 
be selective miracles might be explained otherwise. There may be some evils 
that God cannot (morally) prevent because of his commitment to the rules of 
engagement. On this view, while God is capable (as a matter of sheer power) 
of eliminating such evils, God may be temporarily restricted (morally) from 
doing so by the rules of engagement. Such a framework may account for 
those evils that God would be able to prevent without contravening creaturely 
free will, including so-called natural evils and other instances. The rules-of-
engagement framework posits a broader confluence of factors at work in 
the cosmic conflict (including many unseen factors) such that God may be 
temporarily (morally) restricted from eliminating some evils but will finally 
eliminate all evils forevermore (cf. Rev 21:4), without compromising his utter 
righteousness and love. In the meantime, it may be that there are many evils 
in this world that it would be against the rules for God himself to prevent 
but that we could prevent, if we were willing to make the sacrifices to do so.
Rules of Engagement and the Problem of Petitionary Prayer
This framework might also assist us in making sense of petitionary prayer that 
is aimed, at least in part, toward influencing God to bring about some good 
he might not otherwise bring about. As noted previously, many wonder how 
53 On this claim, see Peckham, Theodicy of Love, chapter 5.
Cognitive Dissonance and Cosmic Conflict 369
it could make sense to think that petitionary prayer could have any impact at 
all on a God who is omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent. Wouldn’t 
God do what is best anyway, given his morally perfect nature? 
In this regard, numerous texts appear to indicate that divine activity is 
indexed somehow to “belief ” and “prayer” (see Matt 17:20; Mark 9:23–29; 
11:22–24; cf. 2 Chr 7:14). For instance, consider the case where Jesus replies 
to his disciples’ question about why they could not cast out a demon, “This 
kind can come out only through prayer” (Mark 9:28–29; cf. Matt 17:20; 
Mark 9:23–24; 11:22–24). This and other texts seem to indicate that at least 
some impediments on divine action are dynamically related to factors such 
as faith and prayer. Indeed, the rules of engagement might be set up in such 
a way that prayer may grant God increased jurisdiction to intervene in ways 
that otherwise would not be available to him within the rules. At the same 
time, the way God responds to prayer may be affected by other factors within 
the rules of engagement (recall the delayed response to Daniel’s prayer in 
Daniel 10).
This understanding sheds light both on: (1) how the influence aim of 
petitionary prayer might make sense, and (2) why God might not answer 
our prayers the way we might think that he should. Regarding the former, 
petitionary prayer may grant God additional permission or open up avenues 
for God within the rules of engagement that were not otherwise available to 
him (morally). Regarding the latter, the way we think God should answer 
prayer might be against the rules of engagement and/or may not be preferable 
given all of the factors involved. In this regard, while prayer may open up 
additional avenues for God, there are also many other factors involved such 
that we should not assume that prayer opens every avenue. Some things might 
remain against the rules of engagement, or otherwise be unavailable or less 
than preferable, regardless of how much and how faithfully believers pray (cf. 
Matt 26:39; Luke 22:32).
In this regard, Christians sometimes pray as if every outcome is “up to” 
God alone, without any cognizance that God himself may face impediments 
due to his commitments to love and the rules of engagement. This sometimes 
causes severe cognitive dissonance; for instance, when prayer for a loved one 
to be cured of some terminal disease appears to make no difference. However, 
it might be that God deeply wants to cure that loved one but that avenue is 
not (morally) available to God given all the other factors involved. According 
to Scripture, as briefly noted earlier, God often does not get what he wants.
In this regard, it seems to me that there is much to learn from Christ’s 
words in his prayer in Gethsemane: “My Father, if it is possible, let this cup 
pass from Me; yet not as I will, but as You will” (Matt 26:39, emphasis mine). 
If it is possible? This phrase suggests that some avenues are not open to God 
given his purposes and the commitments that he has made. For instance, 
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apart from Jesus enduring the cross, God could not justify and save humans 
while himself remaining just (cf. Rom 3:24–26). As such, Christians might 
offer petitionary prayer in a similar manner, praying not only that God’s 
“will be done” (Matt 6:10) but also, “if it is possible, let this cup pass,” while 
intentionally recognizing that some outcomes may not be options (morally 
speaking) for God to bring about.
Given a cosmic conflict perspective with a rules-of-engagement frame-
work, there are far more factors involved relative to God’s action—or seeming 
inaction—than we could fathom. On this view, petitionary prayer (with 
the “influence aim”) need not imply that God is “ignorant, ill-willed,” or 
“manipulative.”54 Rather, on the view that in some cases it might be against 
the rules of engagement for God to bring about a specific good he might 
otherwise want to bring about, but petitionary prayer might open additional 
avenues to God within those rules, one can consistently pray to God for 
his intervention while affirming that God knows what is most preferable in 
any situation, truly wants to bring about what is most preferable in every 
situation, and is never manipulative but is always entirely loving. As such, 
Christians can coherently and fervently pray for divine intervention and even 
cry out to God when we feel forsaken (Matt 27:46), while trusting in God’s 
perfect wisdom and unwavering benevolence (cf. Ps 22; Dan 3:17–18).
Conclusion
The problem of evil is massive and complex and much more should be said 
about not only the problem of evil, but also the related problems of selective 
miracles and petitionary prayer. I am under no illusion that this brief article 
sufficiently addresses the many questions related to these problems. However, 
this article offers some ways that a rules-of-engagement framework might be 
helpful to advance the conversation regarding these massive and troubling 
issues, which hold numerous implications relative to how Christians think 
about God and relate to God in prayer (and otherwise). If nothing else, we 
should recognize that there is far more to the story; much of which we may 
be currently unaware. The ultimate solution to evil is eschatological. In the 
meantime, I believe, the God of the Bible, supremely revealed in Jesus Christ, 
can be trusted.
54 Karris, Divine Echoes, 52.
